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in relation to Jean Genet's Funeral Rites and his later essay on Rembrandt. Genet can be seen to separate 
mourning (which for Freud lies at the basis of identification) from a process of generalized identification 
in which his difference from other people dissolves. A narcissistic formation of personality, evident in the 
symbolism of mirrors in Funeral Rites, gives to this process an added impetus. But the fundamental 
condition of possibility for such generalized identification is the void it reveals at the center of all 
personality. This void not only makes possible the different kinds of identification (heteropathic and 
idiopathic) described by Silverman, it also disturbs any clear distinction between them. It is for these 
reasons that the glamorization of Nazism in Funeral Rites is coextensive with a demystification of its 
power, and the often brutal eroticism of the book is suffused with an ineradicable dimension of 
tenderness. Taken further in the essay on Rembrandt, these themes lead to an ambiguous mysticism in 
which the source of creativity is revealed as inseparable from its ultimate obliteration. 
Keywords 
Jean Genet, psychology, psychological identification, Freud, Kaja Silverman, Funeral Rites, Rembrandt, 
mourning, identification, narcissism, personality, Nazism, mysticism 
This article is available in Studies in 20th Century Literature: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol24/iss2/2 
The Chiasmus of Mourning and 
Identification in Jean Genet 
Peter Benson 
London 
Jaques Derrida's large and labyrinthine book Glas (1974) bor- 
rows its double-columned form (in one among its numerous 
strategies of parasitism) from a short essay by Jean Genet pub- 
lished in the journal Tel Quel in 1967. The slow toll of the death 
knell, sounded in both the title and text of Derrida's book, ac- 
companies Genet's inquiry into the solemn power of Rembrandt's 
later paintings. The full intensity of this power only begins to be 
felt, in Genet's view, following the death of the painter's beloved 
wife Saskia. After experiencing this "baptism of fire .. . his early 
nature, which was bold and conceited, was little by little trans- 
formed." As a result, "he observed his mourning by metamor- 
phosing gold chains, swords, and plumed hats into values, or 
rather into pictorial fetes." Genet concludes that "with Saskia 
dead-I wonder whether he didn't kill her, in some way or other, 
whether he wasn't glad she died-anyway, his eyes and hands are 
free. From then on he launches out into a kind of extravagance 
as a painter" (Genet, "Something" 84; "Ce qui" 24-25;).' 
Alongside these reflections on Rembrandt's art Genet sets 
an account of an incident from his own life with which (at first 
sight) they have no obvious connection. This autobiographical 
column of Genet's text, occupying the left-hand side of the page, 
is lengthier, more detailed, more ruminative and philosophical 
than the text on Rembrandt. It questions, with startling incisive- 
ness, the very basis of personal identity and casts an annihilating 
light on Genet's earlier life and work. In a manner reminiscent 1
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of Jean-Paul Sartre's expositions of human reality in Being and 
Nothingness, these wide-ranging considerations emerge from 
nothing more substantial than a brief exchange of glances with a 
total stranger in a train compartment, which precipitated in Genet 
an abrupt and involuntary obliteration of any sense of personal 
difference, of separate identity, inducing within him a sudden 
conviction of "the universal identity of all men"(78; 22). How- 
ever, this is far from being the expression of a humanistic plati- 
tude, nor is it a political appeal to mutual solidarity. On the con- 
trary, Genet is invaded by a mystical and disturbing sense that all 
people are the same-literally the same being, deceptively split 
into distinct fragments. Far from eradicating loneliness, this rev- 
elation served only to produce and intensify feelings of loss and 
sadness: 
The world was changed. In a third-class carriage between Salon 
and Saint Rambert d'Albon it had just lost its lovely colors, its 
charm. I was already bidding them a nostalgic farewell, and it 
was not without sadness or disgust that I was entering upon 
ways which would be increasingly lonely and, more important, 
was entertaining visions of the world which, instead of height- 
ening my joy, were causing me such dejection. 
"Before long," I said to myself, "nothing that once meant so 
much will matter: love, friendship, forms, vanity, nothing that 
depends on seduction." (80; 27-28) 
In one column, therefore, Genet describes how mourning lib- 
erated Rembrandt into the solemnity and sadness of his later art; 
while in the adjacent column a sense of identification with other 
people, taken to its furthest extreme, empties Genet of the erotic 
fires which had been at the source of so much of his own creativ- 
ity. Derrida characterized the relation between these two columns 
as a "chiasmus" (Derrida 43). The themes of identification and 
mourning are separated and placed on opposed halves of the page, 
but there is, nevertheless, an interchange and reflection between 
them. The achievement of the later paintings of Rembrandt is to 
remove from his portraits all psychological individuality, so that 
each refers identically to the same "sadness of being in the world" 
(85; 27). The separate identities of his various sitters are there- 
fore conflated, reflecting Genet's theme of mutual identification. 2




Genet felt that he was especially prone to the revelation on 
the train because of the particular cast of his mind, the ease with 
which he had always been able to imagine "flowing through his 
eyes into someone else's body" (81; 28). Directly opposite to his 
question, "What was it that had flowed out of my body?" he places 
his claim that Rembrandt's paintings "stop the time that made 
the subject flow into the future" (78, 84; 23). Derrida notes how 
this juxtaposition causes a flow of the signifier "flow" from one 
side of the divided text to the other. Nevertheless, a distinction is 
maintained: flowing is arrested in creative mourning, but released 
in the fatality of uncontrollable identification. 
The transformation of mourning into rich aesthetic produc- 
tivity was a process well known to Genet himself, since it forms 
both the theme and the structure of his book Funeral Rites. This 
book evolves as a complex web of identifications, leading Sartre 
to characterize it as a "hall of mirrors" in which each of the vari- 
ous characters is ultimately revealed to be a mask for Genet him- 
self (Sartre 521, 540). Nevertheless, as I hope to show, mourning 
and identification are here, too, kept deliberately and wilfully 
separated from one another, and this separation is the condition- 
ing factor for the book's creation. 
Though hardly a conventional account of mourning, Funeral 
Rites is one of literature's most powerful evocations of the sense 
of loss which follows the death of a lover. Many passages describe, 
with acute sensitivity, the most universally recognized aspects of 
this experience. These are the very features of the mourning pro- 
cess which led Sigmund Freud to propose a profound theory of 
its significance, linking its deepest import to the role of identifi- 
cation in the formation of our psyche. A brief consideration of 
Freud's theory will therefore reveal more readily the specific origi- 
nality of Funeral Rites, enabling us to disentangle some of the 
reasons for the book's unique fascination. 
Freud considers mourning to be the process whereby libido 
is withdrawn from a lost object and returns to the subject's own 
ego. This reversal is accomplished by the ego itself taking on the 
attributes of the beloved person, so that it too can attract the 
libidinal outpourings of the id, which have now lost their exter- 
nal focus. "It may be," suggests Freud, "that this identification is 3
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the sole condition under which the id can give up its objects." 
The ego therefore "assumes the features of the object," a process 
which effects "the transformation of object libido into narcissis- 
tic libido." This, according to Freud, "makes it possible to sup- 
pose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned 
object-cathexes and that it contains the history of these object 
choices" (SE XIX 29). Identification following loss is the process 
whereby our character is formed, as the crystallized reflection of 
our past affections. Love precedes identity, into which it is trans- 
formed through loss (whether that loss is the result of death, or 
of desertion, or of abandonment). 
Not surprisingly, Freud contends that an individual's "first 
and most important identification" is with his or her parents (SE 
XIX 31). Genet, of course, was an orphan. We can deduce noth- 
ing from this fact alone (for his foster parents might have served 
as identificatory figures). But from the narcissistic formations 
evident in the details of his books, we may perhaps conclude that, 
in his case, we might productively set into play an alternative 
theory of primary identification: that expounded by Lacan in his 
concept of the mirror phase. This suggests that the primary iden- 
tification on which all subsequent and secondary identifications 
build would be with the image of oneself, as seen in a mirror. 
"The child's ego is formed by identification with its like . . . its 
own reflection which is and is not the body, which is like it. The 
child identifies with itself as an object" (Metz 48-49).2 
In a scene towards the end of Funeral Rites, Erik drunkenly 
encounters his own reflection in a mirror: "He put out his arm 
to draw it to him, but his hand encountered nothing" (205). 
Genet, here, invokes the myth of Narcissus who (we should re- 
member) did not pine away because he loved himself, but be- 
cause he failed to recognize the beautiful image in the pool as his 
own. In the same way, Erik's face in the mirror "became tragic 
and so handsome that Erik doubted that it was his own." It is 
with this doubt that he trembles on the brink of the tragedy of 
Narcissus. "He was within an ace of losing his reason in his own 
beauty," because that beauty appeared to him only in the mirror, 
where his body seems "solid," "strong," and "male" (Funeral Rites 
205-06). 4




Lacan explains how the child's image in the mirror appar- 
ently possesses a confident unity and coordination which the 
child itself lacks, thus forming an ideal ego to lure the child to- 
wards its assigned place in the networks of desire. Erik, however, 
does not seek to coincide with the image of maleness in the glass, 
but to "master" it. This desire to dominate turns into a state of 
inarticulate rage. He draws his pistol, and then "The gesture be- 
gun by Erik was continued by the image with set eyes. Its left 
hand opened the holster and took out the revolver, aimed it at 
Erik, and fired" (206). The potential fatality of fascination with 
the mirror could not be better expressed. Erik hallucinates being 
destroyed by his own image. 
At a later point in the story (recounted at an earlier point in 
the book) Erik experiences another encounter with a mirror: "He 
passed a candy-vending machine and saw his black sleeve in the 
narrow mirror" (178). This time, however, the glimpse "fortified 
him against the image of himself" because "to the already sub- 
lime fact of being a tank driver in the German army was added 
the brilliance of his name ... followed by a magical expression: 
. . . the executioner's lover" (178-79). The talisman formed by 
this phrase protects him from the dangers lurking in the mirror's 
shimmering depths. The executioner was the strong male who 
had sexually dominated the young and beautiful Erik, who is now 
taking the first steps towards becoming, in his turn, the domi- 
nant lover of the youthful Riton. 
The primary identification created via the mirror is thus a 
complex and unstable formation. When beauty and desirability 
are alienated in the mirror image, the subject is left bereft and 
enraged. But if the image becomes merely a "dark block" (178) 
guarding his name, the destiny of that name (with its embodied 
history of past affections) will exceed all personal control. 
The first encounter between Erik and the executioner is de- 
scribed in two separate passages. Just before the second of these 
there is yet another encounter between Erik and a mirror, de- 
scribed by Genet in the first person of close identification. 
"Stripped to the waist and wearing my wide black breeches," Erik 
stares into a mirror in which he sees reflected both himself and a 5
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photograph of Hitler (61). This tableau resembles the Lacanian 
account of the mirror phase, in which the child sees reflected not 
only itself but also the mother who holds it. As Christian Metz 
observes, "The child sees itself as an other, and beside an other. 
This other other is its guarantee that the first is really it: by her 
authority, her sanction, in the register of the symbolic" (48). Fixed 
and frozen in a photo, Hitler's image forms an ideal ego for Erik, 
and when he makes love with Riton on the rooftop at the end of 
the book he feels himself at last fully identified with the Fuhrer, 
envisaged as the one who "emitted his transfigured adolescents 
over the humiliated world" (232). 
According to Genet, Rembrandt's early relation to mirrors, 
evident in his first self-portraits, was complacent and without 
anxiety. Later, this self-immersion grew troubled and disturbed, 
leading to his greatest art (84; 24). Erik, by contrast, is disturbed 
by mirrors from the start: they offer a scattering of diverse iden- 
tifications, deflecting him from one to another: Hitler, the ex- 
ecutioner, his own image. The narcissistic formation of his psyche 
is the condition for this mobility of identifications, which re- 
sembles that of Genet himself who, as the book's author, scatters 
himself among its characters. His identification with these fic- 
tional figures is more extreme than that of most authors, and 
more self-consciously proclaimed and discussed. Indeed, a de- 
liberate deflection of identification forms the initiating move 
which produces the book's narration as a perverse act of mourn- 
ing, deviating from the Freudian paradigm. 
Grief-stricken at the death of his lover Jean Decarnin, killed 
while fighting for the resistance in the last days of the war, Genet 
powerfully describes many of those fantasies which Freud found 
to be characteristic of all mourning. "The ego wants to incorpo- 
rate the object into itself," writes Freud, "and, in accordance with 
the oral and cannibalistic phase of libidinal development . . . it 
wants to do so by devouring it" (SE XIV 249-50). Genet accord- 
ingly creates a vivid image of a cannibal feast at which he pre- 
sides, eating Jean's corpse. His description is distinctive, how- 
ever, because although he says "I belonged to the tribe," it is he 
alone who eats the dead flesh and hence "I was sure that I was 
the god ... a divinity whom the Negroes dared not gaze at" (230- 6




31). By contrast, Freud's account of the symbolism of a canni- 
balistic totem feast (in Totem and Taboo) regards the practice as 
forming a community among the brothers who jointly partake 
in it. Genet is definitively set apart from any community, and 
this fact decisively affects the progress of his mourning. 
Arriving at the place where Jean was shot, Genet finds a small 
group of mourners already standing there (38ff).3 He feels con- 
strained by their presence, afraid of "making ridiculous gestures" 
as a consequence of his grief. He realizes that, for the other 
mourners, Jean is dear to them because he is dead (since he died 
for France). They would not allow Genet to bring him back to 
life, even if he could. Were he to attempt such a resurrection, 
they would lynch him, identifying him with Jean's killer (since 
he would be taking from them the martyr who draws their sor- 
rowful admiration). Hence, Genet experiences a sense of identi- 
fication between himself and Jean's killer. This identification is 
initially felt as coming from the others, from an imagined en- 
raged mob: it emerges out of Genet's separation from the "re- 
spectable" mourners. 
A few pages later, there occurs the episode in the cinema 
which crucially determines the whole further course of the book. 
On the cinema screen (which serves here as a replacement, a re- 
lay, for the primordial mirror-cf Metz 48) Genet sees a news- 
reel showing a young member of the collaborationist militia be- 
ing captured. The cinema audience is transformed by this sight 
into a jeering, laughing mob, united by their contempt for the 
captured youth (47ff). Genet is separated from them in (i) rec- 
ognizing the boy's beauty; (ii) desiring him; and (iii) feeling sorry 
for him, despite the fact that the little militiaman might well have 
been the very one who shot Jean. Still drowned in his grief over 
Jean, Genet is "willing to do anything to forget about him." He 
therefore adopts a device, a trick, to do so. It is "the best trick I 
could play on that fierce gang known as destiny" (48). Destiny 
itself is perceived as a mob-just like the cinema crowd whom 
he describes with such revulsion. The trick Genet plays is a form 
of transference: he invests the boy on the screen (on whom he 
confers the name Riton) "with the love I felt for his victim" (48). 7
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For this "work of sorcery" particular gestures are necessary. 
Exactly as at the site of Jean's death, however, the surrounding 
crowd inhibit his ability to perform these gestures in reality- 
they sink, instead, into his vivid imaginary world: "My hands . .. 
clasp each other even though they do not move" (48). His "prayer" 
succeeds in shifting his painful libidinal attachment away from 
the dead Jean. "A bit of love passed over to Riton. I really had the 
impression that love was flowing from me, from my veins to his" 
(50). 
And so we find again that image of "flowing," used in the 
essay on Rembrandt to characterize identification. When the 
image of the boy leaves the screen, "An unbroken flow of love 
passed from my body to his, which started living again" (51). This 
vampiric fantasy gives life (Genet's imaginative life) to the boy 
who in reality (and on the screen) had been captured and was 
probably due for imminent execution. 
Imagining himself dressed in white, as Riton's bride, Genet 
declares: "The wedding celebration would then merge with my 
mourning and all would be saved" (51). Funeral rites would fuse 
with a wedding celebration by means of "the double ray of my 
tenderness" towards both Jean and Riton. 
As this last phrase indicates, a total transference of love from 
Jean to Riton has not been effected. Indeed, it is immediately 
following this scene that Genet first tenderly recalls vivid memo- 
ries of his first act of sex with Jean-beginning that process of 
recollection and mourning described by Freud whereby each 
memory of the beloved is called up, one by one, and 
hypercathected before the libido can be detached from it (SE XIV 
245). Freud also remarks on the frequent occurrence in mourn- 
ing of "self-reproaches to the effect that the mourner himself is 
to blame for the loss of the loved object, i.e. that he has willed it" 
(SE XIV 251). In the cinema, Genet has deliberately and con- 
sciously willed Jean's death and fused this Nietzschean accep- 
tance of fate with an imagined love for the boy who might have 
killed him. In fact, in the course of the book, there is no actual 
description of Riton killing Jean. The designation "murderer of 
Jean" clings to Riton exactly as the epithet "executioner's lover" 8




clings to Erik: it is the seed around which his character will be 
developed. 
As a strategy for escaping the pain of loss, Genet's "trick" 
doesn't work (for that pain continues to be vividly felt and de- 
scribed throughout the book). Nor has he succeeded in erasing 
the love he felt for Jean, transferring it completely to Riton. He 
does succeed, however, in deflecting the identificatory process 
which Freud believed to be inevitably set in motion by every se- 
rious loss. Genet does not identify himself with Jean (whose per- 
sonality and physical appearance are never described in any great 
detail in the book, and who therefore fails to appear before the 
reader with any vividness) but on the contrary with the boy who 
killed him. The figure of Riton gradually emerges (particularly 
in the later scenes) as a believable, poignant, and sorrowful por- 
trait of a youth with little intelligence who joined the militia when 
the Germans seemed to be winning the war, and now finds him- 
self despised by his countrymen and in exile in his own city. Genet 
(the despised thief and social outcast) will seduce us into sym- 
pathy with this boy whom decent and patriotic people must in- 
evitably condemn. And, if we are able to encompass compassion 
for Riton, this will become a mere stepping stone for further pos- 
sible identifications, notably with Hitler himself. Genet treads 
this dark road before us, lighting the way and inviting the reader 
to follow in his identificatory path. 
In her book The Threshold of the Visible World, Kaja Silverman 
discusses the power and effectiveness of works of art which pro- 
vide "the representational terms under which the spectator can 
be brought to identify at a distance with bodily coordinates which 
are both culturally devalued and markedly divergent from his or 
her own." She seeks to inquire how we "might be given the psy- 
chic wherewithal to participate in the desires, struggles, and suf- 
ferings of the other, and to do so in a way which redounds to his 
or her, rather than to our own, 'credit' " (185). 
The examples in her book involve identification across ra- 
cial and sexual boundaries-as, for example, with black gay men 
in Isaac Julien's film Looking for Langston. Though "culturally 
devalued" within American society as a whole, valuing and iden- 
tifying with such marginal groups would be admired and sup- 9
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ported within the world of liberal academia from which 
Silverman writes. Funeral Rites, on the other hand, invites loving 
identification with a young thug and murderer who has betrayed 
his country and is working for the Nazis. Such a character is cul- 
turally devalued both by today's standards, and even more so (in 
guilty reaction to recent acts of collaboration) when Genet wrote 
the book in 1945. The book may thus stand as a test of Silverman's 
claims for the moral and creative value of this process of identi- 
fication, divorced from political sympathy with the object of that 
identification. 
Silverman, however, seeks to distinguish the experience of 
identity-at-a-distance (which she celebrates) from the Freudian 
identification-through-mourning, which she characterizes as 
"murderously assimilatory." Acknowledging that it is a necessary 
feature "at the heart of normative adult subjectivity," Silverman 
believes that this Freudian identification participates in sustain- 
ing "the delusory unity and presence of the bodily ego" (23). 
This distinction between identity-at-a-distance and Freud- 
ian identification, she assimilates to that between heteropathic 
and idiopathic identification as expounded by the German phi- 
losopher Max Scheler, quoting Scheler's definition of idiopathic 
identification as effecting "the total eclipse and absorption of 
another self by one's own," as a consequence of which the other 
is "completely dispossessed and deprived of all rights in its con- 
scious existence and character" (23). However, in Freudian iden- 
tification-through-mourning it is the loss of the conscious ex- 
istence of the other (through death or desertion) which 
subsequently causes one's own self to be eclipsed by the remem- 
bered characteristics of the other. Indeed, Freud uses a strikingly 
similar metaphor, saying that (as an effect of loss) "the shadow 
of the object fell upon the ego," which thereby suffers a (partial) 
eclipse (SE XIV 249). 
I would therefore argue that Freud's account of identifica- 
tion (as the principal, and perhaps sole, process through which 
character and personality are formed) precisely undermines the 
ego's imagined unity, revealing it to be structured from the 
sedimented, multi-layered remembrance of past loves. It there- 10




fore has close affinities to the heteropathic pole of Silverman's 
distinction. Indeed, in her earlier book Male Subjectivity at the 
Margins, Silverman's primary example of heteropathic identifi- 
cation was provided by Fassbinder's film In the Year of Thirteen 
Moons, which he specifically made as an act of mourning for his 
dead lover with whom, in the course of the film, he identifies 
himself (Silverman, Male Subjectivity 270). 
In Funeral Rites, by contrast, Genet lives his mourning as a 
refusal of identification with his dead lover, substituting instead 
a different series of identifications whose nature cannot easily 
be characterized under either of the headings "heteropathic" or 
"idiopathic," since they involve both an invasive usurping of other 
people's lives and a simultaneous fragmenting and disintegra- 
tion of his own ego. 
The various figures with whom he identifies in the course of 
the book all have a real existence in the world around him: Erik 
is a German soldier in hiding, the lover of Jean's mother; Riton is 
the captured militiaman briefly seen on a movie screen; Hitler is 
the German Fuhrer, who was still alive at the time Genet began 
writing the book. But in the pages of Funeral Rites each of them 
takes on quite different characteristics. These additional traits 
are borrowed and transferred from Genet's own personality. In 
giving fictional life to these people, he feeds aspects of himself 
into their veins. It is only on the basis of these imagined simi- 
larities that he accomplishes the leap into identification. 
For example, following a passage in which Genet has been 
ruminating on the fusion of hardness and elegance which he finds 
attractive in Paulo (Jean's brother), he begins a new paragraph 
with the sentence: "Puny, ridiculous fellow that I was, I emitted 
upon the world a power extracted from the pure sheer beauty of 
athletes and hoodlums" (122). Genet might well still be talking 
about himself and the effects of his literary work, but as the para- 
graph proceeds we discover that the first person narration has 
now been taken over by Hitler. Genet imagines a shared love of 
tough young men as a means of insinuating himself into Hitler's 
psyche. 11
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The presence of Hitler in the book, confined to a relatively 
small number of passages, constitutes the heart of darkness of its 
textual system, "the diamond axis .. . on which the world turns" 
(117). Adopting this persona, Genet both cloaks himself in the 
dark glamour of Nazism and at the same time undermines the 
phallic pride of the familiar newsreel figure by presenting him as 
homosexual and castrated. One specific feature of Hitler himself 
enabled Genet to slip inside his skin: his evident addiction to 
gesture and spectacle. Hitler was always "playing the role of Hitler. 
He was representing me," writes Genet (68). Eternally seeing him- 
self before an imagined mirror, Hitler shares with Genet that 
narcissism which, far from being a closing of identity into itself, 
is in fact a primal splitting of the subject, through which the self 
contemplates and seeks to identify with itself. This slight split, 
this tenuous division between self and image, is sufficient to al- 
low alternative identities to flow into the gap. 
A more complex process of forming a link can be found if 
we trace the way that Genet identifies himself with Erik and 
usurps his imagined past. As with Riton, it is initially Erik's con- 
trast with and opposition to Jean that tempts Genet towards iden- 
tification. "Since [Erik's] force and vigor compensated for what 
(despite great austerity) was too frail in Jean's grace, I have ever 
since made great efforts to live his life as a Berlin youngster" (18). 
Notice the literalization whereby Genet seeks, not to imagine 
Erik's life, but to "live" it. "I attempted to retrace the course of 
his life and, for greater efficiency, I got into his uniform, boots 
and skin" (30). 
The first scene in which he begins to describe this fictitious 
life is preceded and prompted by an incident in real life (that 
real life, at least, which is recounted as such in the book, sepa- 
rated from the fantasized scenes) in which Erik appears to ex- 
press desire for Genet: "He pressed against my back. I felt his 
breath on my neck, and, close to my ear, he murmured: 'See you 
tomorrow, nine o'clock, Jean.' He took my hand and insisted 'Nine 
o'clock, yes!' " (30). Genet is excited by the closeness of Erik, but 
immediately recalls that Erik had hated and bullied Jean, and had 
just remarked on the fact that Genet has the same first name. 
Feeling himself to be too closely identified with Jean within Erik's 12




sadistic desire, Genet deliberately steps back from this danger- 
ous identification by choosing to consciously identify himself 
with Erik. His motivation seems to be not so much an avoidance 
of the masochistic position (which he habitually occupied in his 
erotic life) but an evasion of an unwanted identification with his 
dead lover. 
As a scenario in which to embody his newly chosen identifi- 
cation, he concocts a fantasy in which Erik is submissively se- 
duced by a Nazi executioner. He conjures up this story while 
"drunk with the somewhat blurry vision of a tall young Negro 
behind the windows of the cafe in the Boulevard de la Villette" 
(30). The blurred windows are transformed, as in a cinematic 
dissolve, into the fog in which Erik and the executioner meet. 
The beauty and desirability of the Negro intensifies the state of 
erotic excitement necessary for Genet to generate this imagined 
scene, and also deflects his excitement away from the person of 
Erik himself (whose good looks are those of the Germanic "blond 
beast" [206]). In other words, it is by this decisive turn away from 
the Aryan ideal of beauty that Genet channels his erotic energies 
into identifying with the young Nazi. Not only does he betray 
Jean by identifying with Erik, but this identification itself carries 
an ironic betrayal at its initiating core. 
Towards the end of the book, Genet expresses a love for Erik 
which (like that for Jean) is distinct from identification. This is 
one of the terms on which the evolving eccentric process of 
mourning in the book will end ("I loved Erik. I love him" [226] ). 
Within the unfolding of the fantasy narratives, this parallels 
Riton's growing love for Erik, and Genet's close identification 
with Riton. But, in one of the scenes of "real" life interspersing 
this fantasy, a further mediating figure intervenes: Jean's fiancee 
Juliette. "It was she who occasioned my love for Erik," writes 
Genet. Specifically, he sees her ("a dirty unkempt housemaid") 
framed beneath the arch of Erik's muscular arm. "What was there 
about Jean that had made him love so unlovely a creature?" muses 
Genet; "Never would I have the strength to bear my love for Jean 
if I leaned on that wretched girl. On the other hand I could in- 
dulge myself completely if I were supported by Erik" (225-26). 13
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The characterization of Juliette as dirty and unkempt, how- 
ever, points to her similarity with Riton, with whom Genet in- 
creasingly identifies. And if Jean was drawn to her qualities of 
abjection, this may well also have been what attracted him to 
Genet. 
Two funeral processions wind through the pages of the book: 
in one Genet follows Jean's coffin; in the other, Juliette gets left 
behind by the hearse carrying her dead child (which may, or may 
not, have been fathered by Jean). The descriptions of Juliette are 
a curious mixture of comic derision and sympathetic tenderness. 
Her muddled thoughts are described so closely that the narra- 
tion fuses, in these passages, with her consciousness. She and 
Riton are the two characters with whom Genet most easily iden- 
tifies: the suffering guilty traitor and the bereaved mother. At 
the same time, he seeks to place a distance between himself and 
these figures of abjection by emphasizing that both are of lim- 
ited intelligence (a characteristic which clearly doesn't apply to 
Genet himself). 
He hopes the powerful strength of Erik will protect him from 
abjection. But, in the course of the novel, the "dark block of 
[Erik's] funereally-garbed body" (178) has been corroded and 
undermined from within. Genet, putting on Erik's skin, has 
turned him into an executioner's catamite and the cowardly 
murderer of a child. Just as Riton's final act is to shoot Erik dead 
after they have made love, so Genet has stripped him of all his 
invulnerable hardness by worming his way into his imagined life 
and turning it into a version of his own. As with the figure of 
Hitler, the book's celebration of Nazi glamour (whose eroticism 
it savors) is inseparable from a derision of its pretensions. 
Identification in Genet's novel is therefore a process of min- 
gling his own characteristics with those of people quite different 
from himself. There is a striking recurring image of inhabiting 
another's life by occupying an imagined space inside their body. 
Genet describes himself as living "at times inside [Erik] or Riton" 
(56). This relation does not constitute authorial mastery, for its 
terms are entirely reversible: Erik is described as "rising up in- 
side me" (60) and "Jean will live through me. I shall lend him my 
body. Through me he will act, will think" (67). In these descrip- 14




tions, individual people are viewed as vessels or containers for 
disparate and separate incorporated personalities. Another pas- 
sage tells us that: "At the summit of the maid's soul, in the no- 
blest part of her . . . a nervous voice lost patience and cried, 'Be 
qui-et. Be qui-et.' But the poor girl herself could only hear a 
murmuring and did not understand what it meant" (86-87). 
It is with a similar image of incorporation that Silverman 
sought to distinguish between idiopathic and heteropathic iden- 
tification. The analogy she uses not only describes but also ex- 
emplifies such strategies of incorporation, for it is embedded in 
her text as a quotation from Max Scheler, who was himself quot- 
ing Schopenhauer, who had heard the story from an officer of 
the British army in India. Such a multiple-embedded quotation, 
in which the text speaks with borrowed tongues, disrupting the 
unity of the enunciating subject, constitutes (Silverman had ear- 
lier argued) a "heteropathic chain-reaction" (Silverman, Male 
Subjectivity 267). Allowing this chain reaction to continue, I 
quote the relevant passage once again: 
A white squirrel, having met the gaze of a snake, hanging on a 
tree and showing every sign of a mighty appetite for its prey, is 
so terrified by this that it gradually moves towards instead of 
away from the snake, and finally throws itself into the open jaws 
. . . plainly the squirrel's instinct for self-preservation has suc- 
cumbed to an ecstatic participation in the object of the snake's 
own appetitive nisus, namely "swallowing." The squirrel iden- 
tifies in feeling with the snake, and thereupon spontaneously 
establishes corporeal "identity" with it, by disappearing down 
its throat. (Threshold 24) 
Though the snake is intended to represent the ideopath, its 
physical constituents will inevitably be modified by absorbing 
the substance of the squirrel, just as a Freudian mourner takes 
on their lover's characteristics. The snake may seem the smug 
victor in this transaction, but the squirrel may well have carried 
poison in its flesh, some transforming quality inimical to the 
snake's current life and existence. Absorption of another can never 
leave the self unchanged. 
The squirrel, on the other hand, identified at a distance with 
a desire other than its own but, as a direct consequence, failed to 15
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remain at this protective distance. It is in the act of hurling itself 
down the snake's throat that the squirrel effects the identificatory 
leap (Silverman, Male Subjectivity 270). Genet similarly flings 
himself in fantasy into lives far removed from his own. This pro- 
cess resembles that of any other, more conventional, novelist. But 
by retaining his personal characteristics, and mingling them-with 
these imagined other lives, he effects a transformation (at least 
in fantasy) in the objects of his identification. 
On the one hand, this undermines any idealization of such 
figures as Hitler, who would seek to control and channel all iden- 
tification directed towards them by becoming an ego ideal for 
their followers (SE XVIII 116). On the other hand, however, there 
remains an idealization of a specifically eroticizing kind which is 
still possible, provided it be recognized as a cloak which can be 
bestowed at will upon the most unlikely candidates. This is the 
"active gift of love" which Silverman has eloquently celebrated. 
Such idealization, she writes, "lights up with a glittering radi- 
ance bodies long accustomed to a forced alignment with debased 
images" (Threshold 79). This gift of love must be active, she ar- 
gues, to "prevent the congealing of ideality into an intrinsic qual- 
ity of the beloved" (77). These features can be clearly discerned 
in this description of Riton: 
The straps of three loaded machine guns were wound about his 
shirt, went around the belt and up across the shoulders, crossed 
once on the chest and once on the back, and produced a copper 
tunic from which his arms emerged bare from the elbow al- 
most to the shoulder, where the sleeve of the blue shirt was rolled 
into a thick wad that made the arm more elegant. It was a cara- 
pace, each scale of which was a bullet. This paraphernalia 
weighed the child down, gave him a monstrous bearing and 
posture that intoxicated him to the point of nausea. In short, 
he was carrying the ammunition supply. His uncombed hair 
was naked in the darkness. His battered thighs bent beneath 
the weight of armor and fatigue. He was barefoot. (66) 
The dark glamour of power, incarnate in the bandoleers of 
bullets, renders the emphasized nakedness of arms and feet all 
the more vulnerable. This image, in which the book's eroticism 
finds its most concentrated icon, combines an attraction to the 16




spectacle of invulnerability with a tenderness for the figure bur- 
dened by its weight. Elsewhere, Genet describes Riton's life as "a 
frightful misery contained in a very beautiful vase" (148). 
Genet's first reaction to the boy on the movie screen pro- 
vides an extreme example of the active gift of love. But, in the 
subsequent course of the book, he proceeds to dissolve the sepa- 
rating screen between himself and the boy, absorbing himself as 
far as possible into the boy's imagined life. There would seem, 
therefore, no reason to insist, as does Silverman, that "the gift of 
love . . . strives to keep the cherished 'image' outside . . . main- 
taining the object at an uncrossable distance" (Threshold 76-77). 
Genet identifies most strongly with Riton in that vulnerabil- 
ity and exclusion from society which gives his love for the boy its 
dimension of tenderness. This connection is firmly rooted in fea- 
tures of Genet's own life, and is therefore not entirely 
heteropathic, not completely a reaching towards someone quite 
different from himself. On the day the Germans entered Paris, 
Genet had (quite coincidentally) been released from prison. So 
the fall of France coincided with his own liberation (White 187). 
In a similar way, the defeat of the Germans coincided with the 
death of his lover, Jean. Hence Riton's feelings when he watches 
the victory celebrations, which "expel him from joy, from play, 
from pleasures, and . . . display the flags in honor of that exile" 
(215), are identical with Genet's own, and all distance between 
author and character is, at least momentarily, abolished. 
Many years later, sitting in a scruffy railway compartment, 
Genet experiences a similar abolition of distance, but this time 
as an involuntary shock, neither active nor loving. Nor is it tem- 
pered by any trace of desire or idealization in the description he 
gives of his fellow passenger's "graceless body and face, ugly in 
certain details, even vile." He prefaces his account of this inci- 
dent by saying: "A work of art should exalt only those truths which 
are not demonstrable ... those we cannot carry to their ultimate 
conclusions without absurdity, without negating both them and 
ourself" (77; 21). It is this ultimate negation around which Fu- 
neral Rites (and his other literary works) had circled, and to which 
the incident on the train, described in the essay on Rembrandt, 
brought him finally face to face. 17
Benson: The Chiasmus of Mourning and Identification in Jean Genet
Published by New Prairie Press
222 STCL, Volume 24, No.2 (Summer, 2000) 
"Through idealization," Silverman writes, "the subject . . . 
posits an object as capable of filling the void at the heart of his or 
her psyche" (Threshold 70). The simultaneous collapse of ideali- 
zation, love, desire, and distance, left Genet with an awareness of 
"a solid emptiness [un vide solide] which did not cease to per- 
petuate me" (81; 29; Genet's emphasis). A similar image had al- 
ready appeared during the love-making scene at the very end of 
Funeral Rites. Riton fellates Erik who then kisses his lips "still 
parted, retaining the shape and caliber of Erik's prick. The mouths 
crushed against one another, linked as by a hyphen, by the rod of 
emptiness [un sexe de vide], a rootless member that lived alone 
and went from one palate to the other" (237). 
This reference to the typographical sign of the hyphen (in 
French, "un trait d'union") calls to mind a well-known passage 
in Lacan's writings, in which he explains the signification of the 
Phallus within his theory of the unconscious. "One might say 
that this signifier is chosen," writes Lacan, "as what stands out as 
most easily seized upon in the real of sexual copulation, and also 
as the most symbolic in the literal (typographical) sense of the 
term, since it is the equivalent in that relation of the (logical) 
copula" (Lacan 82). The typographical mark of the hyphen-the 
solid connecting bar printed on the page-impersonates the pe- 
nis in its role of connecting bodies to one another. But, in Genet's 
remarkable image, this physical connecting link has become "un 
sexe de vide" 'a rod of emptiness,' a shaped space rather than a 
solidity, an absence rather than a presence, without its function 
of connection being in any way lessened. The Phallus has thus 
been transformed into that "solid emptiness" which, in the 
Rembrandt essay, is discerned at the core of all identification. 
So it is emptiness that links us, at the core of all identifica- 
tion, at the basis of all love, destroying distance as we fling our- 
selves headlong into each other's echoing void, hollow contain- 
ers for refracted light, split by mirrors into illusory separation. 
Every individual's specific characteristics, Genet tells us, are 
"willed by that identity ... which was forever circulating among 
all men" (79; 24). But this shared identity, lying behind all char- 
acteristics, can only be a void with no qualities of its own. In 
Funeral Rites the hollow loss of mourning becomes the occasion, 18




not for an idealizing incorporation of the dead, but for a stray- 
ing and scattering of identity. Exiled from intense amorous ex- 
clusivity, Genet sets about linking himself to others through 
shared traits, until on the book's last page the imagined linkage 
of sex gives way to "un sexe de vide," revealing emptiness as the 
strongest, most universal connection of all. For all the sense of 
loss that this entails, it is on this basis alone that it will be "pos- 
sible for every man to be loved neither more nor less than every 
other . .. to be cared for and recognized-cherished" (79; 24). 
Notes 
1. My quotations from this essay are taken (with slight modifications) 
from the translation by Bernard Frechtman (Genet, "Something"). This 
was published three years before the essay appeared in Tel Quel. How- 
ever, the English version prints the two parts of the text consecutively, 
rather than side by side. For this reason, I also give page references to 
the reprint of the Tel Quel version in Tome IV Genet's CEuvres Completes 
(Genet, "Cc qui"). The page references to the English version are given 
first for each quotation. 
2. This essay by Metz is particularly acute in distinguishing between 
primary, secondary, and tertiary identifications (Cf Metz 58). 
3. From here on, I use the name "Jean" to refer to the dead lover, and 
"Genet" to refer to the author. The fact that they share the same first 
name, though little more than a coincidence, is an additional ripple in 
the waters of narcissism and identification. Decarnin's surname is used 
only in the book's dedication, a fact that intensifies the unity of their 
names in the pages of the text. 
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